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ABSTRACT: The article addresses the fundamental elements of Descartes’ embeddedness in 
the mediaeval and ancient tradition. The more elaborate explication of the common elements, shared by 
Descartes and his predecessors, enables us to reveal more clearly the rupture point in Descartes’ thought, 
and shows clearly in the direction of his  undisputed legacy for the later times, including French Ma-
terialism.
Special attention is paid to M. Heidegger’s claim, based on his specific understanding of the hi-
story of philosophy, that Descartes represents the paradigmatic shift in the self-understanding of man, 
which crucially marks the latter development of philosophy, both idealistic and materialistic. Yet ano-
ther author worthy of explicating in this context is M. A. Gillespie, who clearly adopts Heidegger’s view 
and further corroborates Descartes’ ontological shift to be read from his markedly different theology.
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Introduction
Back then, when the foundations of the magnificent abode of philosophy 
were being laid for the first time, Aristotle spoke of the divineness of theory as the 
thinking of thinking. What then could be the – arguably undeniable – contribu-
tion of Descartes to the eventuation of the modern, Enlightenment philosophical 
paradigm, if his cogito as the thinking thing is so obviously resembling Aristotle’s 
noesis noesews as the thinking of thinking? The question raised readily betrays the 
basic orientation, or method, of our approach to the history of philosophy. Clearly, 
it decide dly turns away from the universalistic historical approach, for which basic 
concepts, or categories, are but identical chess figures undergoing various arrange-
ments on the universally self-same chessboard; and the underlying premise of this 
approach being the »self-evident« self-presence or self-givenness of the subjectivity 
of the subject, which remains identically the same throughout history. Were we to 
adopt this approach, the answer to the question raised above would be obvious, and 
the question merely rhetorical. Instead, the line of thought to be to be pursued here 
is about to show how history of philosophy turns out to be far more than »just« the 
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universal history of rational subjectivity coming to its full completion, exactly in 
that it will attempt to show how Descartes’ dramatic entrance into the historical 
currents of philosophy is actually the very birthplace of the modern (rather than 
universal) paradigm of subjectivity, the event which could only roughly, yet quite 
correctly be labelled as anthropocentrism.
Descartes’ Anthropocentrism
The first, and most obvious, clue to the rise of anthropocentric paradigm 
is Descartes’ (philosophical) relationship with God. We need to merely recall his 
attitude towards the divinity in his Meditations, where he decides in favour of his 
existence with the first necessary premise affirmed in his clear and distinct mind 
that, in order for him to exist, God needs to be truthful and cannot be deceitful. The 
decision for or against the existence of God is thus placed on the (ontologically weak 
as they may be) shoulders of the human being. Nothing of the sort can be found in 
Aristotle’s theologia rationalis, or more appropriately, theologike.
In his famous Meditations, we do indeed find many a passage clear intimations of 
the meditator’s humble comportment towards the highest being, like the one below:
For I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an in-
telligence which is more powerful, or a natural light which is stronger than 
that which I have received from Him, since it is proper to the finite under-
standing not to comprehend a multitude of things, and it is proper to a crea-
ted understanding to be finite; on the contrary, I have every reason to render 
thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given me all the perfec-
tions I possess, and I should be far from charging Him with injustice, and 
with having deprived me of, or wrongfully withheld from me, these perfecti-
ons which He has not bestowed upon me.1
We should not, however, mistake this unwillingness to charge God with inju-
stice for true pious humbleness, as was beautifully demonstrated by Heidegger, who 
stresses the impossibility to pray for Descartes’ God. The following passage is most 
telling in this sense:
And the whole strength of the argument which I have here made use of to 
prove the existence of God consists in this, that I recognise that it is not 
possi ble that my nature should be what it is, and indeed that I should have 
in myself the idea of a God, if God did not veritably exist a God, I say, whose 
idea is in me, i.e. who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our 
1  Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Blackmasks Online 2002, Meditation IV, p. 24.
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mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them all, who is 
liable to no errors or defect [and who has none of all those marks which denote 
imperfection]. From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the 
light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from 
some defect.2 [emphasis J. M. L]
With this, axis mundi, omphalos ges, was once and for all placed into the »belly 
button« of the human being. Simply imagine: not only did Descartes provide a line 
of argumentation for the existence of God; astoundingly enough, the argume ntation 
became grounded in the decision of the human being, based on the intuitively clear 
and distinct representation, on an act of will, which proclaims: God cannot be ot-
herwise that this. And thus begins the story of the modern ego cogito and ego volo, as 
the ever more prevailing anthropo-centrical thought, culminating in godless antro-
podicy of Nietzsche’s self-willed overman.
As straightforward as this story may be, it is of course far from being this simple. 
Descartes has, as many a scholar today readily admits, jumped from the springboard 
of the mediaeval metaphysical (notion of the) Substance. And perhaps even more im-
portantly, he has failed to leave behind something else: if the mediaeval paradigmatic 
comportment nurtured the certainty of redemption, of course via the Other, Descar-
tes shifted the tectonic only insofar as the attunement of certainty, once guaranteed 
by the Other, has moved into the interiority of cogito, and thus transformed itself into 
self-certainty of self-redemption. That this is no mere fancy of a day dreamer can be 
easily, and astoundingly as well, corroborated with the help of a much later Cartesian 
thinker Edmund Husserl, who in his Crisis of European Sciences, towards the very end, 
compares his transcendental turn to religious conversion.
The intertwining of the premodern and modern philosophical paradigm can 
be even more thoroughly unearthed with the help of the late mediaeval Jesuit Fran-
cisco Suárez (and Descartes has definitely read his work), who has earned his reputa-
tion for being the first systematic thinker of Aristotle’s heritage. Suárez’s metaphysi-
cal systemisation of Aristotle’s philosophy, explicated, or better, categorized in what 
was before re-appropriated in a massive variety of non-systematic commentaries, is 
the shortest possible shortcut to the grist to the mill of our underlying thought: 
namely that metaphysics as the root of all sciences (the trunk and the branches 
included, as Descartes himself rewardingly illustrates) always already, in advance, 
remains the root of all philosophical endeavour, all post-modern and so-called post-
metaphysical attempts included – fortunately or unfortunately. 
The author who rewardingly brought our attention to this rather inconspi-
cuous debt of modern philosophy to mediaeval thought is actually the author who is 
2  Ibid., p. 21.
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a true connoisseur of mediaeval philosophy. Before Martin Heidegger, a renowned 
20-century thinker, started with his famous interpretation of Aristotle, distilling 
from him his thinking of being, he had done extensive work on mediaeval philoso-
phy. His habilitation thesis, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning, and his 
subsequent lectures on philosophy of religion, The Phenomenology of Religious Life 
are only the tip of the iceberg in his life-long endeavour to deconstruct both theolo-
gical and philosophical traditions to their common, ancient Greek conceptual roots. 
And one of the mediaeval authors who deserved his meticulous attention, and right-
fully so, is Suárez. Consider for example the following passage from Heidegger’s The 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1988, 80):
Suárez is the thinker who had the strongest influence on modem philoso-
phy. Descartes is directly dependent on him, using his terminology almost 
everywhere. It is Suárez who for the first time systematized medieval philo-
sophy and above all ontology. Before him the Middle Ages, including Tho-
mas and Duns Scotus, treated ancient thought only in commentaries, which 
deal with the texts seriatim.
Heidegger’s philosophical thrust can be exemplified with his strong urge at 
a destruction of mediaeval and modern philosophy, bringing it back to its proper 
origin, to the great beginning of philosophy in Aristotle. His goal was to track the 
premodern and modern notions and concepts back to their Aristotelian origin, and 
exposing the later conceptualizations of Aristotle as inauthentic re-appropriations 
of the great beginner. What Suárez did, according to Heidegger, was to systematize 
mediaeval philosophy, providing, for the first time in the history of philosophy, an 
all-encompassing and systematic interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which, as 
we all know, can hardly be deemed a coherent work. According to the Suárez’ sche-
me, clear distinctions were drawn between general ontology (metaphysica generalis) 
and three special metaphysics (metaphysicae specialis), which included ontology of 
nature (cosmologia rationalis), ontology of mind (psychologia rationalis) and ontology 
of God (theologia rationalis). And it is this classification of metaphysics, found in 
Suárez’ Metaphysical Disputations, that provides a valuable clue to a more genuine 
understanding of the dramatic history of philosophy in its passage from the media-
eval to modern philosophy up to this day.
The thickest metaphysical red line of thought, inconspicuous as it may ap-
pear, is obviously that of Aristotle, Suárez, Descartes, Kant and Hegel. According to 
Heidegger, Kant, as the most famous advocate and visible projectile of the enlighten-
ment project, like Descartes, remains securely rooted in the same – root. Of course 
there are crucial matters which changed the landscape of European thinking plat-
form between Descartes and Kant once and for all, one of them being that, no soo-
ner than with Kant, the objectiveness of reality has changed to what we nowadays 
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generally understand under the objectivity of the object. For Descartes, objective 
reality was still permeated with the mediaeval ontology, the one of Aquinas inclu-
ded, where objective reality as esse intentionale was juxtaposed to the realitas actualis 
of outer reality. In other words, representational reality was for Descartes, as well as 
for Aquinas, still »only« objective reality as established/represented in the mind of 
the thinker, who was surrounded by the formal, actual outer reality of substances, 
resting in themselves, and ultimately relying on the Substance of all substances. 
Consider the next telling passage from Heidegger (1988, 38):
When he [Descartes] is speaking of realitas objectiva and realitas actualis, 
 Descartes here, too, takes realitas in the sense mentioned above – the sense of 
realness or res-ness, German Sachheit – equivalent to the Scholastic quidditas 
{whatness, somethingness}. Realitas objectiva is not identical with the Kantian 
objective reality but just the opposite. In Descartes, realitas objectiva means, 
following Scholasticism, the objectified that which is held over against me 
only in pure representation. The essence of a thing, realitas objectiva equals 
possibility, possibilitas. In contrast, what corresponds to the Kantian concept 
of objective reality, or actuality, is the Cartesian Scholastic concept of realitas 
actualis – that which is actualized (actu). This noteworthy distinction between 
the Cartesian concept of realitas objectiva as tantamount to subjectively repre-
sented possibility and the Kantian concept of objective reality or that which 
is in itself, is connected with the fact that the concept of the objective [objek-
tive] was turned into the exact opposite during this period. The objective, 
namely, that which is merely held over against me, is in Kantian and modern 
language subjective. What Kant calls the subjective is for the Scholastics that 
which lies at the basis, hypokeimenon, the objective, thus corresponding to the 
literal sense of the expression »subject«.
Later Confrontations with Descartes: Gillespie
A similar aspect of Descartes’ rather inconspicuous rootedness in the media-
eval ontology has been most rewardingly revealed by the American researcher Mic-
hael Allen Gillespie, who, in his Nihilism before Nietzsche, discusses Descartes’ debt 
to the nominalist upsurge in the late mediaeval period, namely that of Ockham. 
Again, the covert philosophical thrust at stake in Descartes is related to the theologia 
rationalis issue. In considering Descartes’s onto-theology, the unpredictable and su-
per-rational God of nominalism in Descartes’s edifice of Reason turns out to be a 
rational and predictable God. Ultimately, according Gillespie, the infinite and al-
mighty divine will does not put the human faculty of will and power in any danger; 
rather, on the contrary, it enables it to assume a universal prevalence over nature. 
The Cartesian proof for the existence and goodness of God is unsatisfactory, becau-
se Descartes’ God is powerless rather than all-powerful. Why? He has lost his inde-
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pendence (realitas actualis) and become a mere representation in the human mind. 
The ungraspable almighty God of Ockham’s nominalism (who can, as Descartes 
reiterates in numerous passages throughout his Meditations, be a deceiver) is thus 
replaced by a God who is subjected to the human notion of perfection. In order to 
secure the metaphysical position of the human being under the threatening horizon 
of the almighty (i.e. fundamentally whimsical, amoral) God, which ultimately leads 
to fathomless scepticism, Descartes planted in the human soul the very same infini-
te will and freedom, which proved so utterly dangerous in God (1996, 62): »As it 
turns out, the harmony between man and God in Descartes is grounded in the ra-
dical weakening of God and a brutal magnification of man«.
Even though Descartes attempted to build the Archimedean edifice of ma-
thesis universalis, within which he would be able, as an animal rationale, to gain con-
trol over the irrational nominalist God, himself and nature as a whole, it eventually 
turns out that within the ground of the modern ratio there begins to flourish within 
reason the same irrationality Descartes so frantically sought to tame.
To summarize Gillespie’s basic thrust: over Descartes’ edifice of reason there 
hangs a jumbo poster covered with bold letters MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS, bold-
ly set up against the almighty divine will. It is only because the nominalist God no 
longer relied on universals and the moral order of the creation that Descartes’ cogito 
no longer relied on anything which had not been first of all checked by the most 
powerful weapon against any possible deceit: clear and distinct representation. On-
tologically, or within the special metaphysics of theologia rationalis, the latter comes 
before any universals and God.
After Descartes: Transcendental Idealism and Materialism?
With all this said we can again ask ourselves what then is the purportedly 
undeniable philosophical thrust of the famous writer of Meditations? What is it that 
drastically changed the philosophical landscape and shifted the premodern times to 
modern times? What in the following passage from his first philosophy could have 
actually done it?
It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had 
from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I 
had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that 
I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which 
I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, 
if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences.3
3  Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Blackmasks Online 2002, p. 6.
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Indeed it is possible, regardless of all that we have said so far, regardless of all 
historical influence unearthed here, to claim with certainty (sic!) that, after Descar-
tes, it was no longer possible for philosophy to simply be premodern. In other words, 
all adventurers of the spirit after Descartes, including those who warned against 
such demonic self-confidence and thundered in favour of remaining true to the 
transcendent origin of it all, were no longer capable of being the advocates of trans-
cendence without referring, explicitly or implicitly, to Descartes.
The strongest intimation at what was at stake for the future of philosophy 
after Descartes is his dyad of res cogitans and res extensa. And as many a scholar 
has realized, this psycho-physicalism was the ground, from which grew the trees 
of both modern idealism and (atheistic) materialism or empiricism. The hardly be-
lievable coexistence of, for example, Hegel’s and Wundt’s thought does indeed say 
it all: Hegel’s claim that reason is reality and reality is reason on the one hand, and 
Wundt’s claim that thoughts are produced from the brain in the same manner as 
gall is produced from the bladder on the other.
When Edmund Husserl as the rightful heir of Descartes’ idealistic thrust 
summarizes the history of modern philosophy in his The Crisis of European Scien-
ces, claiming that it proves to be a dramatic and competitive intertwining of trans-
cendentalism and objectivism, it is Descartes he is ultimately referring to. For him, 
the Descartes of the cogito sum was the pioneer of the notorious transcendental turn, 
while the Descartes of the psycho-physical dualism of res cogitans and res extensa 
turned out to be the spiritual father of objectivism, preparing the ground for the 
metaphysically only seemingly presupposition-less natural sciences, and with it also 
– lo and behold – the anti-idealistic thrust of materialism.
To corroborate this claim of the peculiar and paradoxical legacy of Descartes’ 
philosophy, we shall shortly address the work of Denis Diderot, who was famous 
for his determined materialism. In his D’Alembert’s Dream, the philosophical thrust 
is aimed at the very idealism advocated by Descartes. Consider the following pas-
sage, with the dialogue among doctor Bordeu, Mademoiselle de L’Espinasse and 
D’Alembert: 
D’ALEMBERT: What about abstractions?
BORDEU: There aren’t any. There are only habitual omissions, ellipses which 
make propositions more general and language faster and more convenient. 
They are the linguistic signs which have given birth to the abstract sciences. 
A quality common to several actions gave rise to the words vice and virtue, a 
quality common to several beings gave rise to the words ugliness and beauty. 
People said one man, one horse, two animals, and then later they said one, 
136
Studia lexicographica, GOD. 7 (2013) BR. 2(13), STR. 129–138
Janko M. Lozar: Descartes, the Pioneer of the Enlightenment
two, three, and the whole science of numbers was born. We have no mental 
image of an abstract word. We have observed in all three-dimensional bo-
dies length, width, and depth. We have busied ourselves with each of these 
dimensions, and from that we have derived all the mathematical sciences. 
All abstraction is nothing but a sign empty of an idea. All abstract science 
is only a combination of signs. We have excluded the mental image once we 
separated the sign from the physical object, and it’s only by re-attaching the 
sign to the physical object that science becomes once again a science of ideas. 
That’s where the need arises – so frequent in conversation and our written 
works – of dealing with examples. When, after a long combination of signs, 
you ask for an example, you are only asking the person talking to give body, 
form, reality, and some idea to the series of his verbal noises by linking them 
to some established sensations.
D’ALEMBERT: Is that clear enough for you, Mademoiselle?4
No matter how un-Cartesian this may sound, we cannot, and should not, 
mistake this powerful materialistic thrust of Diderot for something utterly different 
or detached from Descartes. To again address the issue of theologia rationalis, which 
bears direct influence on psychologia rationalis and cosmologia rationalis: could the 
enlightenment project, which turned its gaze away from the other-worldly towards 
the this-worldly riches in the promise of proper freedom, equality and brotherhood, 
have originated, and survived till this very day without Descartes’ courage to be the 
thinking think without relying on anything else but himself? 
Conclusion
If in the middle age paradigm God was the creator of both the human being 
as the thinking thing and the world, and the certainty of salvation was to be but 
humbly anticipated in trembling expectation, from Descartes on it is the human 
being who decides for and assumes the burden of the existence of himself, the world 
and God. The »lost link« between God and the creation can be directly surmised 
from the very fact that the world has been reduced to a merely extended substance, 
without any intrinsic value to it, i.e. without any hidden teleology (or divine reason) 
within it. In other words, the world has lost its majestic and wondrous properties, 
bestowed upon it by the Creator.
4  Diderot, D., D’Alembert’s Dream, internet source: http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/diderot/da-
lembertsdream.htm
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From now on, it is solely the human reason which is either capable or incapa-
ble of measuring out and providing the true reasons for what is but extended. What 
do we mean by this »either-or«? Interestingly enough, even though Descartes pro-
moted a determined idealism, which later developed to the fully grown philoso phical 
tree of transcendental philosophy (Kant, Husserl etc.), one of his many philoso phical 
children (positivism, empiricism, realism etc.) was also Diderot’s materialism, which 
is basically a crude form of atheism, already taking root in Descartes’ hardly believa-
ble and dismissive attitude to God.
After taking seriously into account Suárez’s and Heidegger’s claim about the 
unmistakable interdependence of all three specific metaphysics, the gist of the story 
here would be that, after Descartes’ dramatic transformation of rational theology, 
the two other specific metaphysics of rational psychology and rational cosmology 
underwent a massive and radical change as well. After the ultimate metaphysical en-
tity had been made impotent, the world and the human being could acquire but two 
ontological statuses: either the world would transform into an (noematic) end result 
of the a priori intentional work of the consciousness, or the world would become a 
self-sufficient and indifferent material cosmos, with the »cognitive subject« fatefully 
lagging behind with his merely nominal, verbal, abstract, and basically impotent 
thrust at the ultimate material reality.
Schopenhauer was obviously right: materialism is the philosophy of the sub-
ject who forgets to take account of himself. With this, in the modern age, the human 
being loses himself as the subject. Interestingly enough, to get an even more wholesome 
picture of the Enlightenment project, we could push this point even further by loo-
king at his claim from the other side: idealism is the philosophy of the subject who 
forgets to take account of himself cutting himself loose from the Creator and the 
world. And with this, in the modern age, the human being loses the world. 
The fundamentality and necessity of the task of reconsidering Descartes’ le-
gacy to the modern world thus becomes all the more clearer: for what is at stake in 
rethinking the pioneer work of this great man is no less than (in materialism) the 
possibility of the rehabilitation of the human being in all his richness and (in idea-
lism) the rehabilitation of the world in all its richness and – most importantly – its 
domesticity. 
The question remains, however, whether a return to the mediaeval paradigm 
would suffice for this rehabilitation. With this, the present treatise comes full circle: 
was not the loss of the world, which comes so drastically to the fore in modern idea-
lism, already clearly intimated in the mediaeval philosophy and its other-worldly as-
pirations? And was not the loss of the subject, patently obvious in materialism, like-
wise foreshadowed in the mediaeval self-sacrifice for the eternal bliss?
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SAŽETAK: Članak se bavi osnovnim elementima Descartesove uklopljenosti u srednjovje-
kovnu i antičku tradiciju. Opširnije objašnjenje zajedničkih elemenata koje je Descartes dijelio sa svojim 
prethodnicima omogućuje nam da preciznije odredimo točku raskida u Descartesovoj misli te jasno 
ukazuje na njegovo neosporno naslijeđe za kasnija razdoblja, uključujući i francuski materijalizam.
Posebna pažnja posvećena je tvrdnji M. Heideggera, koja se temelji na njegovom specifičnom 
shvaćanju povijesti filozofije, da Descartes predstavlja paradigmatski pomak u samoshvaćanju čovjeka, 
koja je značajno obilježila kasniji razvoj filozofije, kako one idealističke tako i materijalističke. Još jedan 
autor kojega vrijedi spomenuti u ovom kontekstu je M. A. Gillespie, koji jasno prihvaća Heideggerov 
stav te nadalje potvrđuje kako bi se Descartesov ontološki pomak trebao sagledati sa stajališta njegove 
izrazito drukčije teologije.
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